This article studies two types of flexibility used by firms to better respond to uncertain market conditions: resource flexibility and responsive pricing. We consider a situation in which a single flexible resource can be used to satisfy two distinct demand classes. While the resource capacity must be decided based on uncertain demand functions, the resource allocation as well as the pricing decision are made based on the realized demand functions.
Introduction
In the past few decades, most industries have witnessed an unprecedented variety of products, while product lifetimes have continued to decrease (see e.g., Fisher et al. 1994, Mendelson and Pillai 1999) . The ways in which firms respond to the resulting challenges in matching supply and demand are supply-side as well as demand-side oriented. The operations literature traditionally focuses on the former, while the marketing literature primarily addresses the latter. In this paper, we study two types of flexibility which are used by firms to reduce the mismatch between constrained supply and uncertain demand.
The supply-side flexibility addressed in this paper is resource flexibility. We employ a broad definition of resource flexibility which reflects many different operations tactics, such as delayed product differentiation or flexible manufacturing/service capacity. Among the most famous examples of delayed product differentiation is Benetton (see Signorelli and Heskett 1989) , which reengineered the production of knitted sweaters so that dyeing became one of the last stages of the production process. A large portion of Benetton's inventory is, thus, in greige sweaters which are differentiated only after more accurate demand information becomes available.
One of the industries that rely heavily on flexible production capacity is car manufacturing. A recent article (Automotive Intelligence News 2003) reports, "As part of the transformation toward more flexible manufacturing operations at Ford's North American assembly plants, Ford and AAI [Auto Alliance International, a joint venture of Ford and Mazda], are investing more than 644 million USD in new equipment [with] the capacity to run two platforms and run four models or body styles off each platform. [Ford Mustang and Mazda6] will be produced on the same trim, chassis and final lines." According to the AAI President, AAI "will have the ability to change the mix, volume and options of products-all with minimal investment and changeover loss." The article further reports, "Over the next decade, Ford expects to save up to 2 billion USD because its flexible system will cost 10 percent to 15 percent less than traditional systems, with an added 50 percent savings in changeover costs. By mid-decade in North America, about half of Ford's body shops, trim and final assembly operations will be flexible. That number rises to 75 percent by the end of the decade." Flexible manufacturing is also a key part of Ford's Transformation Strategy in Europe. According to the CEO of Ford of Europe (Automotive Intelligence News 2002), "Having facilities which have the flexibility to switch production quickly between models will enable us to be more responsive to changes in customer demand, while keeping our capacity fully utilized."
In both examples, resources such as capacity or inventory need to be acquired while only imperfect demand forecasts are available. By relying on one or few flexible resources, which may be transformed into many distinct products, both Benetton and Ford significantly reduce the uncertainty that they face when making their inventory/capacity decisions. As opposed to resource flexibility, which enables a firm to adjust its supply to a given demand, the other type of flexibility addressed in this paper gives a firm some control over the demand itself. With responsive pricing, a firm can influence the demand for its output by setting prices according to the actual demand conditions and the available capacity.
The management of flexible resources has received significant attention in the operations literature. Most of this research has focused, however, on scenarios with exogenously given prices, and the operations literature reflecting responsive pricing is rather limited. We present a model which reflects both aforementioned types of flexibility: resource flexibility and responsive pricing. Specifically, we consider a firm relying on a single flexible resource which can be transformed into two distinct products. The firm needs to set the capacity level of a flexible resource based on its forecast of the parameters of the demand curves for the two products. After the resource capacity has been locked in, the firm observes the actual demand curves' parameters. Using this information, the firm allocates the flexible resource capacity among the two products and sets prices. This scenario reflects a key difference in the nature of capacity and pricing decisions, typical of many industries. Stemming from the long lead times experienced by many firms, the inventory/capacity decisions often need to be made long before the demand functions are known with accuracy. The pricing decision, on the other hand, is typically much more flexible. A firm can often set prices in response to the actual market conditions, aligning demand with the given supply.
We focus our analysis on key drivers of management and profitability of a flexible resource under responsive pricing, such as demand variability and correlation. We show that when the demand curves' intercepts are normally distributed, the optimal resource capacity is increasing in the variability and correlation of this distribution, while the expected profit is increasing in the variability and decreasing in the correlation of this distribution. As a benchmark for the flexible resource strategy, we consider a firm which supplies each of its two products using a dedicated resource. By comparing the two scenarios, we obtain very simple and intuitive expressions approximating the value of resource flexibility in terms of the increase in the firm's expected profit and the expected consumer surplus.
Finally, we endogenize the firm's cost of the flexible resource by incorporating the pricing decision of the resource supplier into our model. We model the interaction between the firm and its supplier as a Stackelberg game. In this game, the supplier acts as the leader, setting the price at which she sells the resource. The firm responds by deciding the resource capacity. We characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium, and show that when the demand curves' intercepts are normally distributed, the equilibrium capacity as well as the supplier's profit are always nondecreasing in demand correlation, and typically nondecreasing in demand variability. The model that we present in this paper is rather stylized. We believe, however, that it captures major operations as well as marketing aspects of managing a multiproduct firm with price-setting power, in a stochastic demand environment.
Literature Review
There is an extensive body of literature studying various forms of resource flexibility, most of it assuming exogenously given prices. On the other hand, the operations literature which reflects pricing in the inventory/capacity management focuses primarily on a single product. Research addressing the issue of resource flexibility with endogenous pricing is scarce. The initial work on endogenous pricing in inventory/capacity models was by Whitin (1955) and Mills (1959) . They consider newsvendor-type models in which the firm sets price and quantity simultaneously, with the demand distribution depending on price. A comprehensive review of newsvendor-type models with endogenous pricing is provided by Petruzzi and Dada (1999) . They also develop a newsvendor-type model in which a firm faces either a linear or iso-elastic demand curve with a stochastic parameter. They study the scenario in which the firm decides both price and quantity simultaneously before the stochastic element of the demand curve is realized.
Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) consider a single product firm which faces a linear demand curve with a stochastic intercept and has to decide on its capacity, production quantity, and price. Several alternative strategies are analyzed in terms of which decisions (i.e., capacity, output, and price) are postponed until the demand curve uncertainty is resolved. For the price postponement strategies, which correspond to responsive pricing, they consider two alternative decision rules for output quantity. These are clearance where the whole quantity is always sold, and holdback where the firm may not sell the whole quantity. They show that with responsive pricing, the capacity, inventory, and profit are increasing in demand variability, which is consistent with our results. Eppen (1979) shows the benefits of centralization of a multilocation newsvendor by comparing the situations in which the quantity at each location, or, alternatively, only the total quantity needs to be locked in before demands are realized. Except for the assumption of given prices, Eppen's model is very similar to ours. Therefore, contrasting our results to Eppen enables us to identify the impact of responsive pricing on managing flexibility. Specifically, with responsive pricing the optimal order quantity is increasing in demand variability and correlation, whereas with exogenous prices, it may be increasing or decreasing, depending on price and cost parameters. Fine and Freund (1990) model the trade-off between flexibility and acquisition cost of different types of capacity. In particular, they consider an n-product firm that has to decide the optimal mix of flexible and dedicated capacities while the revenue functions corresponding to the n products are uncertain with a discrete set of possible realizations. The realized revenue functions are differentiable and concave in production quantities. After the uncertainty is resolved, the firm sets the production quantities, given the capacity constraints. The assumption of differentiable concave revenue functions holds in the case of linear demand curves and responsive pricing. Fine and Freund address the effect of demand variability and correlation in a numerical example, assuming two symmetric products and quadratic revenue functions. In this numerical example, they consider perfectly positively correlated, perfectly negatively correlated, and independent demand curve intercepts that can assume three possible values: high, medium, or low. Their example demonstrates the following results: (i) total capacity is increasing in demand variance, (ii) flexible capacity has no value with perfectly positively correlated demands, and (iii) expected profit is increasing in demand variance. Our conclusions support (i) and (iii), and they are consistent with (ii). However, we show that (ii) is due to symmetry between the products and it does not hold in general. While the model of Fine and Freund is more general than ours in that it allows an arbitrary mix of flexible and dedicated capacities, their findings related to the effect of demand variability and correlation are based purely on a numerical example.
The following three papers consider models very similar to Fine and Freund (1990) , but, unlike Fine and Freund, all of them assume exogenously given prices. Gupta et al. (1992) consider a model which differs from Fine and Freund (1990) in allowing the firm to start off with some existing capacities. They focus on the impact of the existing capacities on the acquisition of additional capacities. Their results regarding the effect of demand correlation and variability on capacity acquisition are also based on a numerical example. Callen and Sarath (1995) study the optimal capacity acquisition by a risk-neutral as well as a risk-averse decision maker, assuming a general multivariate demand distribution. They explore the effect of demand correlation, demand variability, and risk aversion on the optimal capacity mix. A main result of Van Mieghem (1998) , who considers a two-product firm facing a general bivariate demand distribution, is that a flexible capacity may be valuable even if demands are perfectly positively correlated due to differences in cost and/or revenue parameters. Bish and Wang (2004) generalize the work of Fine and Freund (1990) by considering a firm facing linear demand curves whose intercepts follow a continuous bivariate distribution. They characterize the structure of the firm's optimal resource investment strategy and the conditions under which the firm invests in a flexible resource, considering investment cost and demand parameters. They show that the result of Van Mieghem (1998) , that flexibility may be valuable even under perfectly positively correlated demand, still holds when responsive pricing is employed. This is consistent with our result. The model of Bish and Wang is more general than ours in allowing the firm to invest in flexible and dedicated resources at the same time. On the other hand, using a simpler setup enables us to derive many managerial insights into the effects of key drivers of flexibility, which are difficult to analyze in the more general setup of Bish and Wang. Among recent work on postponement, Aviv and Federgruen (2001a) study a multi-item multiperiod inventory system with random demands and periodic review. Under the postponement strategy, production occurs in two stages, each with its own lead time. In the first stage, a common intermediate product is produced, which is then differentiated in the second stage. Without postponement, the items are fully differentiated in the first stage. By assuming zero stock of the common intermediate product, they obtain a lower-bound approximation of the benefits of postponement. They find close-to-optimal heuristic strategies and use a numerical study to show their high accuracy. Aviv and Federgruen (2001b) analyze postponement in a multiperiod setting in a Bayesian framework with unknown demand distribution parameters. Among the literature focusing on postponement via modular product design is work by Lee and Tang (1997) . The effect of demand correlation is captured analytically by Netessine et al. (2002) , who consider a setting in which flexibility is achieved through downward substitution. They show that in the case with two demand classes, increased correlation induces a shift from flexible to dedicated capacities.
The section in which we endogenize the resource cost follows the setup of Lariviere and Porteus (2001) . They consider a Stackelberg game between a retailer and his/her supplier who is the leader setting the wholesale price. Their retailer is, however, a single product firm, charging an exogenous retail price. Dong and Rudi (2004) extend this model to a multilocation setting, where inventory can be transshipped among locations once demands are known. They conclude that under exogenously given output prices, the supplier typically benefits from lower demand correlation, which is in contrast to our model. The fact that risk pooling at a lower stage of a supply chain may decrease profit at the upstream stage has been established by Anupindi and Bassok (1999) , who show that risk pooling between two independent retailers may decrease their stocking levels, hurting their upstream supplier.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the demand model and formulates the optimization problem the firm faces. In §4, we analyze the resource capacity decision and the resulting expected profit and how they are affected by demand variability and correlation, considering two alternative decision rules for the output quantities. Section 5 studies the value of resource flexibility in terms of the increase in the expected profit and consumer surplus. The cost of the flexible resource is endogenized in §6. We summarize our findings in the conclusion. The analysis is illustrated with numerical examples throughout the paper.
Model
Consider a firm selling two products, indexed by i = 1 2. We assume that the firm faces linear demand curves for the two products, with the vector of intercepts = 1 2 T , identical slopes −b, and a linearly additive cross-price effect d. Thus, to sell the output vector Q = Q 1 Q 2 T , the firm charges the price vector p = p 1 p 2 T , given by the relationship
This is a rather standard demand model in the economics literature. The introduction of parameter d represents an extension of the single product linear demand curve, as it takes into account the substitution/complementarity effect. A positive d indicates that the products are substitutes while a negative d indicates that they are complements. Most applications are characterized by a nonnegative d, i.e., products made by the same flexible resource tend not to be complements. Because a product's own price effect on its demand should be more significant than the cross-price effect, it is required that d < 1. While it is assumed for analytical tractability and transparency that the two demand curves have the same parameters b and d, the case of asymmetric demand curves is discussed in Appendix 1. Uncertainty is modeled by assuming that the vector of the demand curves intercepts has a continuous probability distribution characterized by a joint density function f on and correlation coefficient = 12 / 1 2 . We denote the realization of as x = x 1 x 2 T . For some of the comparative statics, we will assume to follow a bivariate normal distribution. To deal with the issue of the nonnegativity of , we will assume that the coefficients of variation are not extremely large and, hence, the effect of the negative values of is negligible.
We define a resource broadly so that it may represent a production capacity as well as inventory. Taking into account long lead times, we assume that the resource capacity must be set prior to the realization of the demand curve intercepts. Let q be the capacity of the flexible resource that is acquired at a unit cost w. Resource flexibility means that the allocation of the resource between the two products can be postponed until the demand curves intercepts are realized, and this allocation is only constrained by the available capacity of the flexible resource, i.e., Q 1 + Q 2 q.
Pricing flexibility, i.e., responsive pricing, means that the price vector p is set only after the demand curve intercepts are realized. The degree to which a firm can use price to respond to actual demand curves depends on the market structure rather than being a firm's choice. We consider a monopoly case in which the prices and sold quantities are duals. Thus, we can take the firm's decision variable to be the output vector Q which is sold at the market clearing prices. These can be easily derived from (1) and are given by
While we are not considering any cost of transforming the resource into sold products, such as variable cost of production or differentiation, it can easily be incorporated into the distribution of . Specifically, if t i is a unit cost of transforming the resource into a sold unit of product i, it can be incorporated into the model by replacing by the new random vector
We thus will not, without loss of generality, explicitly reflect any such costs.
We consider two decision rules for output quantity. Using the terminology of Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) , these are holdback and clearance. Holdback means that after observing , the firm utilizes the revenue-maximizing fraction of its available resource (i.e., it does not necessarily utilize/sell all of its resource). Clearance means that after observing , the firm utilizes all of its available resource.
We analyze the suboptimal clearance decision rule in addition to holdback for several reasons. Considering an approximated clearance decision rule enables us to obtain closed-form expressions for the resource capacity, expected profit, and the value of resource flexibility. These expressions provide us with nice insights into the effect of demand variability and correlation that hold for any demand distribution. We show analytically when these expressions replicate those for holdback. We also illustrate numerically that the qualitative insights derived for the approximate clearance are representative for the exact holdback case. Even if holdback is the optimal decision rule, one might think of cases in which a firm may employ clearance. Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) refer to holdback as a "refined" policy in comparison to clearance. Other phenomena outside the scope of this paper which might induce clearance in practice include the firm's incentive structure (e.g., the manager is rewarded based on quantity rather than revenue), benefits of a sale in addition to its initial revenue (e.g., customer loyalty and network externalities in multiperiod settings, and revenues from after-sale service), or the high cost of inventory disposal (e.g., chemical products).
We are now ready to formulate the firm's decision problem. In the first stage, the firm decides the resource capacity q based on the distribution of . In the second stage, the flexible resource is allocated between the two products, based on the realization of . The firm thus faces a stochastic program with recourse which can be formulated as
where
and where Ɛ denotes expectation and S is the set of feasible output vectors Q that depends on the firm's decision rule for the output quantities. If the firm employs holdback, the feasibility set is S h = Q Q 0 1 T Q q , and if the firm employs clearance, the feasibility set is S c = Q Q 0 1 T Q = q .
Analysis
We now move on to analyze the resource capacity decision and the resulting expected profit and how they are affected by demand variability and correlation. This is done for both holdback and clearance.
Holdback
The unconstrained solution to the second-stage revenuemaximizing problem is Q i = i / 2b , i = 1 2. The constraints can be binding/nonbinding in four different combinations. We partition the state space of , 2 + , into four regions, 1 4 , each region corresponding to one of these combinations. Formally, we define (see Figure 1 for illustration)
Mapping of the state space of into the output space under holdback.
Space of output vector Q State space of ξ
Furthermore, we use 234 q to denote the union of 2 q , 3 q , and 4 q . If the demand curve intercepts are relatively low, i.e., ∈ 1 q , it is optimal not to utilize the whole resource capacity. The unconstrained solution of the allocation problem is then achieved and the quantities sold are given by Q 1 = 1 / 2b and Q 2 = 2 / 2b . If the demand curve intercepts are relatively high, so that ∈ 234 q , the firm will utilize all of the available resource capacity. This can occur in three different ways. If the difference between the two demand levels is not too large, so that ∈ 2 q , the firm will sell a positive quantity of each product. These quantities will be
If the demand level for product 1 is much higher than the demand level for product 2, so that ∈ 3 q , the firm will use all of the resource to make product 1. That means Q 1 = q and Q 2 = 0. In this case, the marginal revenue of the qth unit of product 1 is higher than the marginal revenue of the first unit of product 2. The last case is symmetric to the previous one. That is, if ∈ 4 q , then Q 1 = 0 and Q 2 = q. As mentioned before, products made by the same flexible resource tend not to be complements. If, however, the products were complements, i.e., if d < 0, then under some extreme realizations of , one of the two prices (but never both of them) might be negative. For example, if ∈ 1 q and 2 d < − 1 , then p 1 < 0. Because this is a very low probability event, we do not expect it to have a significant effect on expectations. In particular, the expected prices are always positive. Conditioning on , the expected revenue under optimal allocation (4) can be written as
The optimal resource capacity is characterized by the following proposition:
then the resource capacity q h maximizing the expected profit q S h is found by solving
with respect to q. If
then it is optimal to set the resource capacity equal to zero, i.e., q h = 0.
Proof. All proofs are in Appendix 2.
The left-hand side of the optimality condition (6) is the expected marginal revenue of the resource, d q S h /dq, which corresponds term by term to the expected revenue (5). If ∈ 1 q , it is optimal to use only a fraction of the available resource capacity and, thus, an additional unit of the resource has no effect on the revenue. Therefore, there is no term associated with 1 q in (6). If ∈ 2 q , then all of the resource capacity is used and a positive quantity of each product is sold. This implies that Q 1 + Q 2 = q and the marginal revenues from both products must be equal, i.e., d
Hence, the marginal revenue of the resource capacity q is
The first term of the left-hand side of (6) follows. Finally, the last two terms of the lefthand side of (6) represent the cases in which the whole resource capacity q is allocated to only one of the two products. In these two cases, an additional unit of the resource would increase the revenue by
The second and third terms of the left-hand side of (6) follow. At an interior optimum in terms of q, the expected marginal revenue of the resource must be equal to its marginal cost w. Next, we consider the intuition behind the condition under which the optimal resource capacity q h is an interior solution, i.e., q h > 0. First, note that the expected marginal revenue of the resource is decreasing. The firm will therefore invest in the resource only if the expected marginal revenue evaluated at zero exceeds the unit cost. The first unit of the resource would be used to produce one unit of the product with the higher demand level with expected revenue
The firm will invest in the resource only if this is greater than w. Two key drivers of the value of flexibility are demand variability and demand correlation. We next examine the impact of these drivers. For this purpose, we assume to follow a bivariate normal distribution. The normal distribution is widely used to represent demand variability, and its correlation structure is amenable to analysis. In some of the following analysis, we assume, for tractability and transparency, that the standard deviations of the two intercepts are identical, i.e., 1 = 2 ≡ .
The Impact of Demand Variability on Resource Capacity and Profit. Demand variability is the very reason to have flexibility. Without responsive pricing and under normal demand, the resource capacity is increasing in demand variability if and only if the optimal resource capacity exceeds the expected demand, while the expected profit is always decreasing in demand variability (see Eppen 1979) . This subsection sheds light on the crucial difference made by responsive pricing in terms of how to manage a flexible resource and whether demand variability is desirable. We start by characterizing the effect of demand variability on the optimal resource capacity.
Proposition 2. If has a bivariate normal distribution with
To establish this result, it is sufficient to show that the expected marginal revenue d q S h /dq, i.e., the lefthand side of (6), is increasing in . The impact of on the expected marginal revenue is driven by the convexity of the marginal revenue as a function of , MR , over 1 q ∪ 2 q . From Proposition 1, it follows that MR is piecewise affine and jointly convex over 1 q ∪ 2 q . In particular, MR is zero in 1 q , and it is affine, increasing in 1 and 2 over 2 q . Clearly, high realizations of lead to higher values of MR , while MR is constant for low realizations of . Because of this asymmetry in the effects of high and low realizations of , more variability in leads to a higher expectation of MR . (Note that MR is not jointly convex over the whole + 2 , but the terms from 1 q ∪ 2 q dominate the analysis.)
It is easier to develop the intuition behind this result in a simpler single-product setting. Consider the resource capacity that maximizes the profit in the deterministic case, i.e., when the demand curve intercept is known. If the firm sets this resource capacity when the demand curve intercept has the same mean but is uncertain, a high (low) demand curve realization will result in under/over-investment cost, which we define as the difference between the realized profit and the profit based on the ex-post optimal resource capacity.
If the demand curve distribution is symmetric around the mean, then under clearance, the under-and over-investment costs are also symmetric and the optimal resource capacity is the same as in the deterministic problem. Under holdback, the firm can mitigate the cost of over-investment by holding back some of the resource. Consequently, the under-investment cost will be more significant than the over-investment cost, inducing the firm to invest more. In other words, the firm will respond to higher demand variability by acquiring more of the resource because of the option not to use all of it.
The magnitude of the impact of demand variability on the optimal capacity under holdback for independent demand curves' intercepts is illustrated in Figure 2 (a). This figure is based on the values b = 1, d = 0, and a symmetric bivariate normal distribution of with 1 = 2 = 10 ≡ which forms the base case for numerical illustrations throughout the paper. (To assure that the numerical results are not distorted by the negative realizations of the normal distribution, we plotted analogous graphs for the truncated normal distribution and they yielded essentially the same values.) Note that as the standard deviation increases from = 0 to = 5, the increase in the optimal resource capacity q h varies from 21% (for w = 1) to 6% (for w = 5).
To derive further analytical results related to demand variability and correlation, we use an approximation of the problem formulation. In particular, we relax the nonnegativity constraints imposed on the output vector Q. This means that we replace the set of feasible outputs, S h , by a new set S h = Q 1 T Q q . Recall that the events ∈ 3 q and ∈ 4 q correspond to such a difference in demand levels for the two products that it is optimal to sell only one product. In many applications, it will almost always be optimal to sell strictly positive quantities of both products. In these applications, the probability of ∈ 1 q h ∪ 2 q h will be close to one. Clearly, if Pr ∈ 1 q h ∪ 2 q h = 1, then the approximation replicates the exact formulation. This condition can be further modified so that it depends only on the model parameters, as given in the following lemma. 
For distributions with an unbounded support such as normal, the condition in Lemma 1 will, in general, not be satisfied. Figure 3 shows the approximation error of the expected profit at optimum in the case of normally distributed . Clearly, the approximation works best, i.e., the probability of selling both products is highest, if the demand levels are positively correlated, have low coefficients of variation, and the optimal resource capacity is relatively high (the unit resource cost is low relative to ). Figures 3(a), 3(b) , and 3(c) consider correlation coefficient equal to −0 5, 0, and 0.5, respectively, each plotting the percentage error as a function of w for ∈ 3 4 5 . Note that with d = 0, the expected price at which the first unit of product i can be sold is = 10. Thus, with the unit cost w = 5, the first unit of each product can be sold, in expectation, at a 50% margin, making it a rather high unit cost. Figure 3 shows that the approximation is very close to the exact solution for the combination of the parameters considered. For the remainder of the analysis of the holdback strategy, we employ this approximation. The next proposition characterizes the effect of demand variability on the expected profit q h S h .
Proposition 3. If has a bivariate normal distribution with
Demand variability means that the resource capacity decision needs to be made under uncertainty, resulting in under/over-investment cost. As a result, higher demand variability leads to a lower expected profit when the output prices are fixed. Under responsive pricing, the firm will be able to take advantage of high demand levels by selling at a high price, while it can mitigate the impact of low demand levels on sold quantity by charging a low price. Proposition 3 implies that, in expectation, this effect dominates the effect of under/over-investment, and overall the firm benefits from demand variability. Note that both of our results on the impact of demand variability are consistent with the findings of Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) for the single product scenario.
The magnitude of the impact of demand variability on the expected profit at optimum under holdback for independent demand intercepts is illustrated in Figure 2(b) , which also confirms that the result of Proposition 3 is representative for the exact formulation. As the standard deviation increases from = 1 to = 5, the increase in the expected profit q h S h varies from 20% (for w = 1) to 46% (for w = 5).
The Impact of Demand Correlation on Resource Capacity and Profit. Together with demand variability, demand correlation is a key driver of the effect of flexibility. Without responsive pricing and under normal demand, the effect of correlation on the resource capacity is similar to the effect of variability. In particular, the optimal resource capacity is increasing in demand correlation if and only if this capacity exceeds the expected demand, while the expected profit is always decreasing in correlation (see Eppen 1979 ). The next proposition shows that pricing makes a crucial difference for the effect of correlation on resource capacity. The magnitude of the impact of demand correlation on the optimal resource capacity under exact holdback, q h , is illustrated in Figure 4 (a). For standard deviation = 3, as the correlation coefficient increases from = −1 to = 1, the increase in the optimal resource capacity q h varies from 15% (for w = 1) to 1% (for w = 5).
To prove monotonicity of the expected profit in the correlation coefficient for an arbitrary d is difficult, and we only prove it for the special case of d = 0, i.e., assuming no cross-price effect.
Proposition 5. If has a bivariate normal distribution and d
A higher demand correlation means, in expectation, a smaller difference in the two demand levels to be exploited by resource flexibility. Thus, the benefits of flexibility and, hence, the expected profit, decrease. The magnitude of the impact of demand correlation on the expected profit at optimum under exact holdback is illustrated in Figure 4 (b). For standard deviation = 3, as the correlation coefficient increases from = −1 to = 1, the decrease in the expected profit q h S h varies from 6% (for w = 1) to 25% (for w = 5). We now turn to analyzing the problem under clearance.
Clearance
Recall that under clearance, in contrast to holdback, the firm always uses all of its resource, i.e., S c = Q Q 0 1 T Q = q . Thus, clearance is generally suboptimal. We next characterize the resource capacity q c , which maximizes the expected profit under clearance for an arbitrary distribution of demand curve intercepts.
Proposition 6. If
then the resource capacity q c maximizing the expected profit q S c is found by solving
An important reason why we consider clearance is that an approximation of the clearance model can be solved in closed form and analyzed for any demand distribution. This approximation is analogous to the one used for holdback, i.e., we relax the second-stage revenue-maximizing problem by dropping the nonnegativity constraints. In particular, let S c = Q 1 T Q = q . The condition under which The following corollary presents the solution to the approximate clearance problem. 
While the resource capacity q c depends only on the expectation of , (7) indicates that the expected profit is increasing in i for i > j and it is decreasing in i otherwise. The expected profit is always decreasing in . Thus, as in the holdback case, it is desirable for the demand curves' intercepts to have high variances and to be strongly negatively correlated. Note that under clearance, this result does not assume any particular distribution of .
Under some distributions of , it is always optimal to utilize all of the optimal resource capacity under holdback, q h . Holdback and clearance are then equivalent, in terms of both the optimal resource capacity and the optimal expected profit. Clearly, this requires the state space of to be bounded so that cannot assume too low values. The following lemma states sufficient conditions on the distribution of for holdback and clearance to be equivalent. T Q q h will be binding with probability one. Holdback and clearance will therefore be equivalent, i.e.,
Clearly, holdback and clearance will be equivalent if it is never optimal to hold back any of the resource, i.e., Pr 1 q h = 0. Intuitively, this will be the case if cannot take on too low values relative to q h . This means that for holdback and clearance to be equivalent, there cannot be too much variability, and w cannot be too low. This is exactly what the condition in Lemma 3 states.
If the conditions in Lemmas 2 and 3 are satisfied at the same time, then q c = q h and q c S c = q h S h . This indicates when the closed-form expressions for the resource capacity q c and the expected profit q c S c are accurate approximations of the corresponding exact values under holdback. The percentage error of approximating the optimal expected profit under holdback with the closed-form expression for the approximate expected profit under clearance is illustrated in Figures 5(a) , 5(b), and 5(c) for correlation coefficient equal to −0 5, 0, and 0.5, respectively, and for ∈ 1 5 . Note that when using q c S c as an estimate of q h S h , there are two main drivers of error. First, clearance is, as noted earlier, suboptimal and, hence, leads to underestimating the expected profit, and its effect on error is caused by realizations of in 1 q h . Second, relaxing the nonnegativity constraints on the output quantities leads to over-estimating the expected profit, and its effect on error is caused by realizations of in 3 q h ∪ 4 q h . As seen from Figure 5 , the former of these effects is strong for higher values of (because Pr 1 q h then is relatively high), while the latter of these effects is strong for low values of (because Pr 3 q h ∪ 4 q h then is relatively high). The two effects partially offset each other, which makes q c S c a good estimate of q h S h .
The Value of Resource Flexibility
One of the primary objectives of this paper is to quantify the value of resource flexibility. As a benchmark, we consider a situation in which a firm relies on two dedicated resources rather than on a single flexible resource. That means that in the first stage, i.e., while demand curves are uncertain, the firm decides two dedicated resource capacities q = q 1 q 2 T that are acquired at the same unit cost w. In the second stage, resource i can be used to satisfy demand for product i only. (Note that while q has denoted the flexible resource capacity, boldface q denotes the vector of dedicated resource capacities.) The decision problem faced by the firm in the dedicated resource scenario can be formulated as follows:
and where S n is the set of feasible output vectors Q. Under holdback, the feasibility set is S h n = Q 0 Q q , while under clearance the feasibility set is S c n = Q Q = q . For the analysis in this section, we restrict our attention to clearance so that the optimal solution can be found in closed form. Under clearance, the firm will sell quantities Q = q at market clearing prices p q . Let q c be the solution of (8) under clearance. By comparing n q c S c n with the approximate expected profit at optimum under resource flexibility and clearance, q c S c , we obtain a closed-form expression approximating the value of resource flexibility that is stated in the next proposition. Note that this result does not assume any specific distribution of .
Proposition 7. The increase in the expected profit due to resource flexibility under clearance can be approximated as follows:
Proposition 7 implies that the value of resource flexibility is increasing in i if and only if i > j , and it is always decreasing in . Clearly, the value of flexibility is most significant if the two demand levels are highly variable and negatively correlated. In such cases, the firm benefits from demand variability due to responsive pricing while facing limited demand risk due to resource flexibility. It is interesting to note that resource flexibility is valuable even if 1 and 2 are perfectly positively correlated, provided that 1 = 2 (which leads to asymmetric output prices). This is consistent with Van Mieghem (1998) who shows, under fixed prices, that a flexible capacity may be valuable even under perfectly positively correlated demands if the profit margins are asymmetric. Figure 6 illustrates how the value of flexibility depends on the standard deviation for independent demand curve intercepts and w ∈ 1 5 . As shown in Figure 6(a) , the value of flexibility under holdback, defined 
n , is increasing in the standard deviation, confirming the intuition gained from Proposition 7 for approximate clearance. Further, in the example considered, the value of flexibility under holdback is increasing in w. To build intuition for this behavior, first note that when none of the dedicated resources is used fully (i.e., a fraction of each of the two capacities is held back), then flexibility cannot be beneficial in terms of realized revenues. As w increases, the optimal resource capacities (under either policy) decrease, and the probability of none of the dedicated resources being used fully decreases. The value of resource flexibility thus increases. The value of flexibility under clearance, defined as
n , is plotted in Figure 6 (b). Under clearance, the firm does not have the "flexibility" to hold back capacity and hence the flexibility in allocating capacity between the two products becomes more important under low demand realizations. As a result, the value of flexibility under clearance is high even for small unit price w because under dedicated resources the firm cannot mitigate low realized demand intercepts by holding back some of the resource quantity. Further, because the added value of holdback is small for large w, so is the difference between the values of flexibility under holdback and clearance. The value of flexibility under approximate clearance, defined as
n , is shown in Figure 6 (c). Note that, by Proposition 7, this value does not depend on w. Finally, by comparing the three parts of Figure 6 , we see that the value of flexibility under clearance has a quite good approximation, and is close to the case of holdback for high values of w when the effect of holdback is small. But even for low values of w, the qualitative insights generated by Proposition 7 in terms of the effects of demand variability and correlation are representative also for holdback.
Figures 7(a), 7(b), and 7(c) illustrate the magnitude of the effect of the correlation coefficient on the values of flexibility V h , V c , and V c , respectively, for = 3 and w ∈ 1 5 . The effect of w and the differences between holdback, clearance, and approximate clearance, in Figure 7 are similar to those in Figure 6 .
So far, we have only addressed the effect of flexibility within a firm which itself employs a flexible resource. However, resource flexibility may also affect other links of the firm's supply chain including the firm's customers and the resource supplier. We next focus on the impact that resource flexibility has on the firm's customers. A standard measure of a firm's impact on its customers is the consumer surplus which captures, in monetary terms, the net utility gained by the customers from purchasing the firm's output. The consumer surplus is defined as the difference between the price a customer is willing to pay and the price she actually pays, integrated over all customers purchasing the product. To isolate the impact of resource flexibility on the expected consumer surplus, we compare this surplus in the cases of flexible and dedicated resources. To make this comparison transparent, we consider approximate clearance, which results in the following expected consumer surplus:
The expected consumer surplus in the case of dedicated resources and clearance is defined analogously as
The next proposition compares the consumer surplus and output prices in the two situations.
Proposition 8. The increase in the expected consumer surplus due to resource flexibility under clearance can be approximated as follows:
The expected output prices are unaffected by resource flexibility in the sense that
With dedicated resources and clearance, the output of each product, and hence the realized consumer surplus, are independent of the realization of . With resource flexibility, on the other hand, relatively more of the resource is allocated to the product with higher demand level. Therefore, relative to the scenario with dedicated resources, this product has a higher output, a lower price, and consequently, a significantly higher consumer surplus, which more than offsets the relatively lower consumer surplus from the less demanded product. The value of flexibility for consumers (11) has a similar parametric dependency as the value of flexibility for the firm (10), even under exact clearance and holdback, and hence is not illustrated numerically.
Despite being equal in expectation, the output prices have different distributions in the two scenarios. With dedicated resources and clearance, each product's output is independent of the realization of . The demand curve variability is thus equivalent to the variability of prices. With resource flexibility, a firm responds to particular demand levels with resource allocation as well as prices. The demand curve variability is thus partially absorbed by the resource allocation and does not fully translate into price variability.
Endogenous Input Price
So far, we have only considered endogenous output prices, taking the input price to be given exogenously. In this section, we extend this model by endogenizing the price of the flexible resource w. In particular, we consider the strategic interaction between the firm which employs a flexible resource and its supplier of this resource. The firm relies on a flexible resource purchased from a supplier who produces the resource at a constant unit cost c and sells it to the firm at a unit price w. We assume that all parameters and the distribution of are common knowledge to both firms.
Consider the following sequence of events. In the first stage, while the demand curves faced by the firm are uncertain, the supplier sets the flexible resource price w. The firm responds by ordering capacity q w , and the supplier provides this capacity to order. Thus, the supplier does not face any uncertainty. In the second stage, the firm observes the demand curves and prices its two products accordingly. Hence, a Stackelberg game arises, in which the supplier is the first mover. The supplier sets w to maximize her profit s w = w − c q w , taking into account the firm's best response. We assume that the firm applies holdback, and we approximate its expected profit by q S h , which leads to the firm's optimality condition
Equation (13) is nothing but the inverse demand function faced by the supplier. It is therefore convenient to rewrite the supplier's profit as a function of the capacity q, i.e.,
where w q is the price inducing the firm to order capacity q, given by (13). If c 1 + 2 / 2 1 − d , then any price ensuring a positive margin for the supplier w > c will induce the firm to order nothing, i.e., q w = 0. To avoid this triviality, we assume that c < 1 + 2 / 2 1 − d . The following proposition, characterizing the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game, involves the generalized failure rate defined in Appendix 2. For a reference on the generalized failure rate, see Lariviere (2004 Equations (13) and (15) are the optimality conditions for the firm and the supplier, respectively. The firm's optimality condition sets the expected marginal revenue of the flexible resource equal to w. The supplier's optimality condition sets the marginal revenue of her output equal to c.
The property of increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR) is satisfied by most common distributions including triangular, gamma, and normal. Therefore, if the intercepts are independent uniform, independent exponential and, most importantly, bivariate normal, then 1 T satisfies the IGFR property. We next present comparative statics of the equilibrium with respect to demand variability and correlation. Observe that if i = j , then the relationships in (i) and (ii) are always satisfied. In §4, we established that with a fixed w, an increase in = i = j or in induces the firm to increase q. Such an increase in demand variability or correlation thus raises the whole demand curve faced by the supplier. This obviously benefits the supplier, who sells more, achieving a higher profit. This is in contrast to the scenario with fixed output prices where the supplier's profit is typically decreasing in demand correlation (see Dong and Rudi 2004) . The opposite effect of demand correlation on the supplier's profit in our setting is due to a different effect of demand correlation on the firm's optimal resource capacity under responsive pricing. This result further highlights the importance of pricing assumptions, traditionally not a primary focus of operations literature.
Conclusion
In this paper, we address two types of flexibility that a firm can use to better match uncertain demand and constrained supply: resource flexibility and responsive pricing. We consider a two-product price-setting firm which can satisfy stochastic demands for its two products relying on two resources, each dedicated to one product or, alternatively, it can employ a single flexible resource which can be transformed into any of the two products. Resources have to be acquired while the demand curves for the two products are uncertain, whereas the pricing decision can be postponed until the demand curves have been observed. Our model of resource flexibility reflects many different operations strategies, ranging from product variety postponement to flexible manufacturing/service capacity.
We contribute to the rather extensive operations literature dealing with resource flexibility by studying it along with pricing flexibility. Reflecting the relationship between demand and price sheds new light on the management and profitability of flexible resources. We demonstrate that factors such as demand variability and demand correlation may have a different impact on the optimal resource capacity and profit under responsive pricing than under fixed prices. In particular, we show that when the demand curve intercepts are normally distributed, the optimal capacity of the flexible resource is increasing in demand variability as well as in demand correlation, while the expected profit is increasing in variability but decreasing in correlation. We propose a simple intuitive expression approximating the value of resource flexibility in terms of its impact on the firm's expected profit.
Resource flexibility affects the firm's customers as well as its supplier. We find a simple intuitive expression approximating the value of resource flexibility in terms of its impact on the expected consumer surplus. Finally, we endogenize the input price by taking into account the pricing decision of the supplier of the flexible resource. We model the interaction between the firm and its supplier as a Stackelberg game and characterize its equilibrium. When the demand curve intercepts are normally distributed, the equilibrium resource capacity as well as the supplier's profit are always nondecreasing in demand correlation, and typically nondecreasing in demand variability. These results are different from those derived in the existing literature under the assumption of fixed output prices. The assumption of responsive pricing thus provides new perspectives into the management and value of flexible resources, from the viewpoint of a firm using a flexible resource, as well as from the view of its supplier and its customers.
Appendix 1
In this appendix, we consider the case of demand functions with asymmetric parameters, i.e., 
The second-stage revenue-maximizing problem under holdback is then
Because D is positive definite, the objective is concave and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker necessary and sufficient conditions are
As in the symmetric case, we partition into four regions:
1 q = x x 0
2 q = x x 0 Note that while the asymmetry of b and d adds to the problem complexity, the structure of the solution remains the same.
the optimality condition (6) 
